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ABSTRACT: We sketch and defend a Commitment View of testimony. Unlike alternative approaches, we focus on 
the ordinary act of testifying, attempting (i) to identify the commitments essential to this speech act and (ii) to 
explain why those commitments are practically necessary. In view of this account, we argue that given the 
commitments undertaken in testifying, a speaker’s testimony can qualify as evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In an earlier paper, we criticized the accounts of testimony offered respectively by Elizabeth 
Fricker and C.A.J. Coady for failing to adequately delineate the range of utterances that properly 
qualify as testimony (Kauffeld & Fields, 2003). Although rivals, each of these accounts broadly 
identifies testimony with assertions (Coady, 1992; Fricker, 1987; 1994). Neither account 
specifies characteristics internal to the act of testifying which might constrain the range of 
utterances which qualify as testimony. As a result, each of these highly influential accounts 
admits as testimony utterances – such as gossip – that are by their nature epistemically unreliable 
and so, from both theoretical and practical points of view, ought not to qualify as testimony. Our 
previous essay was primarily critical: it did not develop a constructive account of the internal 
characteristics that ordinarily distinguish genuine testimonial utterances from other acts of 
saying-so. 
The primary thrust of this essay, therefore, will be to delineate those features of the 
communicative act of testifying which plainly distinguish it from other kinds of utterance. In 
courts of law, someone offering testimony takes an oath committing him or herself to the 
veracity of what he or she says and indicating his or her willingness to undergo cross-
examination. These and related internal constraints qualify courtroom utterances as testimony. 
Our question is: what commitments undertaken in connection with seriously saying something 
serve in ordinary day-to-day communication to license consideration of an utterance as 
testimony? Our attempts to answer this question will rely upon a broadly Gricean account of 
communicative acts (Grice, 1969; Kauffeld, 2001a; 2001b; Stampe, 1967; 1970; 1975).  
However, powerful objections have been raised against the kind of account we offer. The 
strongest of these holds that testimony cannot be construed in terms of the freely undertaken 
commitments of speakers and, at the same time, be held to be a form of evidence which 
functions as justification for beliefs. Defense of our account requires that we address this 
objection. That burden is born by the second part of our essay.  
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THE COMMUNICATIVE ACT OF TESTIFYING  
 
Our attention now turns to articulating a conception of testifying which accords with ordinary 
usage and plain practice. ‘Testimony’ is used in several senses; our aim here is to analyze a 
central sense of the term which marks out the essentials of the basic paradigm for testifying—a 
paradigm which yields testimony that can be directly evaluated as evidence. We begin with an 
analysis of our preferred conception of testifying and then turn to the pragmatics which underlie 
and constitute acts of testifying. 
 
The essential components of testifying 
 
According to a recent New York Times story, on October 30, 2001, as the Enron Corporation was 
coming apart at its seams, one of the company’s own lawyers, Kristina Mordaunt, approached an 
outside group brought in to investigate Enron’s affairs and said, ‘I have a duty as an Enron 
employee to answer your questions, and I’ll fully cooperate, but I don’t want to be part of any 
political witch hunt’ (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 9). This presequence introduces a statement which 
clearly qualifies as testimony. From the report of this episode we can discern the essential 
components of testifying: (i) a speaker who serves as the Testimony Source (S) and an 
addressee(s) to whom the testimony is given, the Testimony Recipient (R); (ii) a statement which 
serves as S’s testimony; (iii) an expression of S’s consent to critical examination of her 
statement(s); and (iv) S’s pledge to speak truthfully. 
Consider first the partners to testimony. In our example Kristina Mordaunt is the source 
of the testimony. She has, we are told, come to testify as a matter of her duty as an Enron 
employee. Her ostensible motivation, while relevant to appraising her testimony and also 
characteristic of one sort of testimony, is not an essential feature of the communicative act she is 
performing. Testifying, per se, is not identified by the considerations which induce persons to 
speak up. Some witnesses are hostile and speak only because they are enjoined to testify; others 
are paid for their testimony; many testify as a matter of cooperating in a joint venture. Ms. 
Mordaunt testified in an institutional setting. That is often the case with testimony but is not 
essential. We testify in a variety of institutional and non-institutionalized settings. 
Second, Ms. Mordaunt approaches the investigators in order to make a statement; she has 
come to seriously say things to them. Her utterances, what she says as reported in direct or in 
indirect speech, make up her testimony, and it may also be reported as her ‘statement.’ She tells 
the committee (according to our reporter) that more than year before she was approached by an 
Enron executive, was presented and accepted a now suspect investment opportunity. If Ms. 
Mordaunt did not say that, then it would not be true that she has so testified. It will be true that S 
has testified that p, only if it is true S said that p. 
Third, Ms. Mordaunt manifestly consents to critical examination of her statement. She 
makes her consent apparent by deliberately and openly speaking with the intention of answering 
the investigators’ questions regarding what she knows about matters relevant to their inquiry. 
The intention with which she purports to speak belongs to a large family of speaker-intentions, 
members of which are essential to a variety of communicative acts. Where a speaker makes a 
proposal, she speaks with the intention of answering such questions, doubts, objections etc. as 
might be raised in response to some proposition she puts forward for consideration and, possibly, 
action (Kauffeld, 1995; 1998). In primitive cases of accusing, the accuser tries to impose on the 
accused an obligation to answer the accusation (Kauffeld, 1998). We routinely initiate 
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discussions by announcing our willingness to answer questions; we are, we say, ‘open to 
questions.’ Someone giving testimony deliberately and openly gives it to be known that she is 
speaking with the intention of answering her addressees’ questions. To say that a potential 
witness refused to answer one’s questions is to say that the witness refused to testify. Even in the 
case where a witness is only willing to speak for the record and refuses to answer questions from 
her immediate audience, her address for the record clearly anticipates future questions. Of course 
persons often openly speak with this intention in contexts where no actual dialogue in the form 
of questions asked and answered occurs. Questions are often anticipated and attributed to 
addressees on the basis of the speaker’s supposition about their interests and need to know. 
Commonly, when persons openly speak with the intention of answering questions, they 
circumscribe the range of inquiries they will entertain. Thus a speaker may specify the focus or 
topic for questions she is willing to answer by requesting questions regarding, her argument, her 
lecture, her recent travels, etc. Occasionally a speaker may place certain questions off limits. Ms. 
Mordaunt circumscribes the intention with which she speaks in two ways: first, she is there to 
answer questions out of her duty as an Enron employee; that duty is to cooperate in the inquiry. 
Second, she is unwilling to join in a witch hunt, i.e., she is unwilling to engage in speculation 
focused on the guilt of specific individuals. Consistent with this later commitment she declines to 
answer questions which invite her to speculate about the plans of a fellow employee, Andrew 
Fastow. She is willing to identify assumptions she made relative to actions she took, but she 
restricts herself to telling the investigators what she knows. Ms. Mordant deliberately and openly 
speaks with the intention of answering questions regarding what she knows about matters related 
to the focus of her addressees’ investigation. This intention is an essential component of 
communicative act she is performing. 
When testifying, a person openly speaks with the intention of answering questions 
regarding her knowledge of matters of serious interest to her addressees. Testimony naturally 
focuses on what a speaker knows. Related assumptions and qualification may enter into a 
person’s testimony, but what is wanted in testimony is a representation of what the testifier 
knows and how she comes to know it. It would be odd to say, e. g., * ‘We have asked Martha to 
testify, although we all (including Martha) know that she knows nothing relevant to our inquiry.’ 
(Though, of course, we might conduct a little charade in which Martha goes through the act of 
testifying.) And it is also apparent that when testifying a speaker openly intends to respond to 
questions bearing on the serious inquiry, investigation, deliberation, etc. of her addressees. It 
would be odd for recipients of testimony to insist that a source should testify about matter which 
the recipients admitted had no bearing on their investigation. 
The fourth essential component of Ms. Mordaunt’s communicative act is her pledge to 
speak truthfully. In order to testify in courts of law, witnesses must take an oath swearing to tell 
the truth. Our dictionaries recognize that an attestation of veracity, i.e., some explicit affirmation 
by S that what she says is true is an essential part of testifying in the sense of interest here (OED, 
‘testify’, first entry). As reported, Christine Mordaunt provides such affirmation by saying that 
she is there to cooperate fully with the inquiry. ‘Full cooperation’ here means not only that she 
will answer her addressees’ questions but also that she will provide answers on which they can 
rely. By this commitment she attests to the veracity of her testimony. In many cases similar 
commitments are elicited in a preliminary solicitation during which R explains to S the 
importance of the inquiry and the need to rely on what potentially knowledgeable parties can 
contribute. Here S’s consent to answer R’s question would attest to the truthfulness of her 
statement(s). The minimal explicit commitment to truthfulness required of S is a pledge to speak 
THE COMMITMENTS SPEAKERS UNDERTAKE IN GIVING TESTIMONY 
 
 
235 
the truth if only because she supposes that her addressees may ultimately rely on what she says. 
It is this commitment which differentiates Ms. Mordaunt’s testimony from a mere self-report of 
her actions. That commitment, of course, can be undertaken in many forms, including an oath 
swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.  
In summary, it will be true that S has testified that p, only if (i) S said that p, (ii) 
deliberately and openly speaking with the intention of answering R’s questions regarding what 
she knows about matters bearing on R’s investigation, and (iii) S commits herself to speaking 
truthfully in view of the possibility that R may rely upon what she says. These are the essential 
components of our core conception of the act of testifying. Using that concept, we do ourselves 
sometimes truthfully report that so and so testified that p, and in those cases the speaker will 
have performed an act which has, at a minimum, the components essential to our concept of 
testifying. Working on the substantive assumption that our conception of testimony is based on a 
stable, often efficacious practice, let us now inquire into how in paradigm cases a communicative 
act with these components might reasonably be expected to work 
 
The pragmatics of testifying  
 
In what follows we offer and defend the plausibility of a conjecture about the practical 
constitution of our speech act, the strategic calculation which guides speakers and addressees in 
paradigm cases of testifying.  
At its pragmatic base, the act of testifying is designed to enable R to collect and evaluate 
statements as evidence bearing on R’s inquiry into matters of serious concern to R. Persons 
sometimes have the task of evaluating evidence and reasoning in order to reach a conclusion or 
decision about matters of considerable importance, decisions and judgments for which R must 
accept primary or full responsibility. A serious inquiry of this sort can rarely be conducted 
entirely on the basis of inquirer’s first hand experience; as a practical matter, others must be 
consulted. In such cases a prudent investigator seeks persons who have or seem to have 
knowledge that could serve as evidence filling in the gaps in what the inquiring party already 
knows. By engaging an apparently knowledgeable source in conversation, an inquirer can (in 
favorable circumstances) come to know what the former knows about the matter in question. 
Testifying is, per hypothesis, characteristically designed to enable an inquirer to acquire 
statements from others which can serve as evidence and reliable bases in reaching conclusions. 
The central practical difficulty facing persons who seek testimony (and also those who 
seek to provide it) arises from the fact that persons responsible for a serious inquiry typically 
cannot just accept what others are willing to tell them on the basis of the other’s say so. Where a 
speaker says that p, e. g., that she was given and accepted an opportunity to invest in one of 
Enron’s sham partners, she engages (other things being equal) a presumption that she is speaking 
truthfully, i.e., that she is expressing beliefs she sincerely holds on the basis of a reasonable 
effort to ascertain their truth (Stampe, 1967; 1975). In many circumstances, that presumption 
provides adequate warrant for simply accepting what the speaker says as the truth (Kauffeld, 
2001a; Stampe, 1967). But in the circumstances which call for testimony, the inquiring party 
cannot simply rely on that presumption. Part of the difficulty is that the presumption of veracity 
is vague as to what the speaker has actually done to ascertain the truth of what she says, and it is 
notoriously the case that persons believe they know things on the basis of woefully inadequate 
efforts to determine the truth of the contents of those beliefs. In circumstances where the 
inquiring party must accept responsibility for a decision or judgment of major concern, the 
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inquiring party needs to check out and test what he is told by seemingly knowledgeable sources. 
He wants to know what his sources believe they know about matters bearing on his inquiry and 
also how they come to know the stuff they purport to know, how their statements compare to the 
statements of others, etc. In short, he needs to be able to critically and publicly examine potential 
sources of evidence.  
That need, in turn, creates two difficulties which, we submit, testimony is 
characteristically designed to resolve. The first is the problem of consent, and the second is the 
problem of veracity.  
We do not, in general, have a right to critically question others about what they say to us. 
There are, to be sure, a good many institutionalized relationships within which one party is 
authorized to cross-examine others regarding what they say. But testimony can also be secured in 
non-institutional settings and by persons who are not specially authorized to demand it of others. 
In the ordinary course of affairs persons normally do not have a right to critically question what 
others say to them. Nor is it the case that persons generally can be expected to be enthusiastic 
about entering a conversation in which what they say is subject to critical examination. For one 
thing such conversations may well seem pointless to a potential source of information. One’s 
critical questions are apt to meet with a response on this order: ‘If you’re not going to believe 
what I say, what’s the point to answering your questions?’ For another, conspicuous refusal to 
simply accept what others tell us on the presumption that they are speaking truthfully would in 
many cases be taken as an insult. Moreover, having one’s statements examined critically under 
the pressure of questioning carries an unsettling risk of exposure. Even where one is certain 
about what one knows, it still may turn out that one is mistaken, and, sometimes, an impeccably 
knowledgeable witness gets tripped up by questions. So, commonly persons have a right to 
abstain from answering questions about what they have said when those questions issue from a 
skeptical supposition that they might be mistaken or otherwise in error, and they often have 
motivation to abstain. The upshot of this is that in the circumstances which lead an inquirer to 
seek testimony, it typically will be necessary to secure the consent of the information source in 
order to press one’s questions. 
This necessity explains in practical terms why a manifestation of consent is an essential 
component of our concept of testimony. A speaker can, by deliberately and openly giving it to be 
believed that she is willing to answer questions regarding what she knows bearing on another’s 
inquiry, manifest her consent to critical scrutiny of her answers. Per hypothesis, such consent is 
practically necessary to securing testimony in paradigm cases of this communicative act. 
In addition to this expression of consent the inquirer also needs from the potential 
informant a reassuring commitment to speak truthfully. This need is rooted in the impact which 
A’s manifest skepticism has on the conditions which enable parties in a conversation to trust each 
other. Other things being equal, where a person seriously says that p, she incurs an obligation to 
speak truthfully. The general conditions under which such obligations are incurred have been 
illuminated for us by G. J. Warnoch. According to that eminent English philosopher, one party 
(B) incurs an obligation to do x, where (i) another party (C) is counting on B to x, and (ii) C will 
suffer harm if B fails to x, and (iii) B will have spoken or acted falsely, should B fail to have xed 
(Warnock, 1971). Thus where a speaker says that p, deliberately and openly speaking with 
intention that her addressee believes that p, she incurs an obligation to speak truthfully. If she is 
insincere or careless regarding the truthfulness of what she says, she risks causing her addressee 
the harm of believing something which is false, under circumstances in which the addressee has 
reason to rely on her veracity, and in which she will have spoken falsely (Kauffeld, 2001a; 
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Stampe, 1967). Consider now the impact which a skeptical attitude on the part of a critical 
questioner has on this rational framework under-girding conversational trust. A manifestly 
skeptical inquirer is patently unwilling to simply rely on what his information source says as 
regards the content and formation of what she purports to know. It will at least be apparent that 
the credence he gives her statements will depend on what the inquirer takes her answers to show 
about the empirical and rationale adequacy of the beliefs she expresses, the apparent sincerity of 
her utterances, how her answers square with each other and with other sources of information, 
etc. Accordingly, the potential information source has good reason to doubt whether the inquirer 
is relying on or will rely on her truthfulness in forming his own beliefs about the matters in 
question, and with this doubt, if nothing is done to correct the situation, she will have 
corresponding reason to doubt whether she is obliged to truthfully answer the skeptical inquirer’s 
questions.  
We can now see why a pledge to speak truthfully is a practically necessary component in 
paradigm cases of testifying. It would not do to have S proceed on the supposition that, since R is 
responsible for checking out the truthfulness of her utterances and seems determined to do, she is 
free to provide false and evasive answers. In order for S’s statements to merit critical 
examination, she must produce them while bearing a mutually recognized obligation to speak 
truthfully. So something on the order of a reassuring pledge of veracity is practically necessary to 
enable R to collect potentially reliable testimony. An inquirer can secure such reassurance, where 
a potential source of testimony commits herself to telling the truth if only because she supposes 
that the inquirer may ultimately rely upon her answers. That commitment we have seen is a 
minimally essential component of testifying. 
There is much more to say about this rather preliminary account. Arguably, it squares 
with the ways in which a speaker’s performance in the act of testifying and her immediate 
product are criticized. It remains to be seen whether the conditions offered by way of analysis are 
sufficient, whether our paradigm of testimony exhibits a practical calculation variants of which 
can be seen to be at work in related kinds of testimony. But we at least have an initial view of the 
conditions which are essential to an important ordinary conception of testimony and, 
correspondingly, are practically necessary to successful performances of acts of that kind, and 
we have a plausible conjecture as to why those conditions are both practically and conceptually 
necessary to testifying. 
 
THE EVIDENTIAL OBJECTION  
 
As we stated in the introduction, there is an argument against this way of viewing testimony that 
must be dealt with if the approach is to have any chance of being correct. This argument has to 
do with the sort of justification that instances of testimony, construed in the way that we do, 
would provide for the beliefs that their addressees might base upon them. The argument goes like 
this. Assume that, in general, testimony does provide justification for those who receive it to 
entertain certain relevant beliefs. (There may also be reasons, along the lines of what Coady 
(1992) and Price (1969) have proposed, to believe that testimony, in general, does this. But, for 
the purposes of our discussion here, it does no harm to treat this as a basic rational assumption.) 
It then follows that the view of testimony being proposed is false, for: this view of testimony 
entails that the sort of justification that a piece of testimony t provides an addressee A for 
believing that p is non-evidential. 
1. But the justification that t provides A for believing that p must be evidential. 
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2. Therefore, testimony does not provide justification for those who receive it to entertain 
certain relevant beliefs. 
3. But (by assumption) testimony does provide such justification. 
4. Therefore, this view of testimony is false. 
Our goal in this section of our paper is to show how and why this argument doesn’t work. 
First, we examine the evidence in favor of the second premise, attempting to determine if, in fact, 
there is reason to believe that this premise is true. Second, we examine the evidence in favor of 
the first premise, attempting, with respect to it, to do the same. Our claim will be that, while 
there is good reason to believe that the second premise is true and that testimonial justification 
does need to be evidential, there is no good reason to believe that premise one is true – that the 
sort of view we are proposing would permit only a non-evidential form of testimonial 
justification. Indeed, we argue to the contrary, a commitment theory of testimony is essentially 
an evidentialist theory, because, on it, speaker-commitments (when genuine) reveal something 
about the character of the speaker. They are a manifestation of those stable dispositions in a 
person that can be reliably linked – that is, evidentially linked – to certain sorts of action and 
activities. 
 
Why testimonial justification must be evidential  
 
Must testimonial justification be evidential? There are at least three basic reasons to argue that it 
is. First, testimony is used as evidence in a variety of formal settings. When, for example, two 
people are engaged in an adversarial dispute in a court of law, or when a single individual or a 
group of individuals is being prosecuted by the state, eyewitness or expert testimony is 
invariably relied upon by the judge or jury as evidence. It is used both to establish certain factual 
particulars of the case at hand, and as a basis upon which the persons empowered to render 
decisions in such cases make their final judgments, as well as numerous subsidiary inferences. 
Second, testimony is used as evidence in a number of important non-formal settings. Say 
that a scientist is trying to determine whether or not the results that she obtained in a particular 
experiment ought to be relied upon. If others have been doing work in the same area of study, 
she will want to compare her results with theirs. In doing so, she will make no distinctions 
between what she has done and what has been done by others, in terms of the potential evidential 
value of each. The accounts that have been produced by others with respect to their work she will 
treat as evidence in favor of one set of scientific claims, while the results that she has obtained 
through her own work she will treat as evidence in favor of the same set of claims, or another set, 
as the case may be. In comparing her own work with others, she balances what she takes to be 
evidence against evidence, without seeing any essential difference in the way that her own 
observations support her claims and the reports that she has received of the observations of 
others. 
And, finally, the alternative to treating testimony as evidence is just not all that palatable. 
We understand (or at least we think that we understand) what we mean when we say that a tree’s 
rings are evidence for some claim about that tree’s age. We mean that there is some sort of 
reliable connection between the first of these states of affairs and the second, such that we can 
use a statement referring to the first in order to generate likely conclusions about the second. But 
what could it possibly mean to say that a piece of testimony gives us a non-evidential 
justification for some belief or claim about the world? Does it give us permission to believe that 
such-and-such is the case simpliciter, without the underlying belief that there is some sort of 
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reliable connection between the speaker’s utterances and the way the world seems to be? That 
interpretation founders on the fact that one of the quickest ways to undermine the justificatory 
power of a testimonial statement is to demonstrate that there are inadequacies in the perceptual 
or cognitive abilities of the individual producing it. Or does it merely provide the ground for our 
responding in the ways that we do? Is testimony no more than a trigger for a set of responses and 
behaviors that are rationally justified only insofar as they are part of all human beings’ natural 
inheritance? This way of looking at it is problematic, as well. For while people do sometimes 
respond to what others have said by automatically forming certain beliefs and leaving it at that 
(this is typical of small children and perhaps also of those who are extremely gullible), they also 
respond by using testimonial statements in inferences that they make – by treating them as 
evidence. 
It will not do, then, to treat testimonial justification as something other than evidential. It 
would conflict with how people use testimony in formal settings. It would conflict with how 
people use testimony in important informal settings. And it would require a notion of 
justificatory power that would do violence to the ways in which testimony is actually employed 
by all but the most naïve of human believers. 
 
An argument in favor of the non-evidentiality of testimonial justification  
 
Clearly, then, testimonial justification is necessarily evidential. Less clear, however, is whether it 
can be conceived in this manner on a Commitment View of Testimony. For on that view, as we 
have been expounding it, an addressee R is justified in believing that p on the basis of a speaker 
S’s testimony t, given that S has freely undertaken to commit herself to the veracity of t and is 
willing to be questioned regarding t and/or its subject matter. R is justified in his beliefs, in other 
words, on this view, because S followed through on a set of choices that S freely made – choices 
that, as the word ‘freely’ indicates, originated with S and that S could have genuinely decided not 
to make (that is, assuming that hard determinism is not true). 
The problem, as several writers have noted, is that this view of testimony seems to be at 
odds with our notions of evidence and evidential justification (Moran, 1999; Ross, 1986; Weiner, 
2003). Recall the example of the tree rings and the age of a tree. The reason why we are willing 
to allow the former to count as evidence in favor of claims about the latter is because we know 
that there is a direct and reliable connection between the two states of affairs, one that has been 
confirmed by numerous past correlations and is explained in terms of the processes and causal 
powers engaged in and possessed by (certain sorts of) trees. If this relation did not exist, or 
existed only haphazardly – varying from tree to tree for no discernable reason – we would not be 
able to employ statements referring to a tree’s rings as evidence in an argument about that tree’s 
age. Instead, we would conclude, from looking at any given tree’s rings, that we had no idea how 
old that tree was on the basis of its rings alone. 
But notice that this sort of direct and reliable connection is exactly what seems to be 
missing from the Commitment View of Testimony. On that view, it is not the case that the 
addressee is justified in basing her beliefs on what another has testimonially stated because that 
individual has been affected by reality in some direct and reliable way (a way that terminates 
with that individual stating what she says to A). Indeed, if the basis for a speaker S testifying to 
something in such a case were of this nature, it would be a reason, on the Commitment View of 
Testimony, for thinking that what S had said was not testimony. It would not even count as a 
speech-act, but rather as some sort of speech-compulsion. 
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Instead, what is going on here is that S, in speaking, has simply created a representation 
of reality, much as one might create an oil portrait or a watercolor landscape. Representational 
elements are certainly at play, but they are present, not due to some direct (reliable, explicable) 
causal activity on the part of that which they represent, but rather because of the free choice of 
the individual who employs them. As a result, the picture of reality proffered by the speaker in 
such a situation, while it may be accurate or inaccurate, is not evidence for anything beyond the 
speaker’s wishes and intentions. It is not evidence for the state of affairs that S is trying to get A 
to believe, anymore than a portrait by Gilbert Stuart of George Washington kissing Abigail 
Adams is, in and of itself, evidence that she was stepping out on John. And so, it does not 
provide evidential justification for the truth of any belief that A might have formed about that 
state of affairs as a result of receiving S’s testimony. 
 
Objections to this argument  
 
However, there is no good reason to think that a Commitment View of Testimony has this sort of 
implication and a set of very good reasons to think that it does not. Consider again the example 
of Gilbert Stuart painting a portrait of General Washington caught in flagrante delicto with the 
delightful Mrs. Adams. It is true that, considered as an artifact, without any knowledge of the 
painter’s experiences, intentions, or general state of mind, this picture gives us no evidence 
regarding the actual relations between these two individuals. (Blackmailers in the eighteenth 
century had to use letters to ply their trade, and even then the victim could always claim that the 
letters were forgeries.) But what about those cases where we do have such knowledge? What if 
we knew that Gilbert Stuart was an honorable and reliable man, that he had a code of ethics and a 
professional standard that did not permit him to pass off made-up images of reality as genuine? 
Wouldn’t this make a difference as to how we would treat the painting? After all, if we knew 
these things about Stuart, we would also have strong reason to believe that there was a direct, 
consistent connection between those events that he had himself experienced and what he freely 
chose to represent as that experience. They would be connected by his tendency to accurately 
represent those elements of reality that he has freely chosen to portray. 
The preceding argument presupposes a highly malnourished notion of effective 
causation. In fact, it seems to involve a simplistic bifurcation. The implication is that the only 
acceptable ways of viewing causation are: (1) causation is impersonal, deterministic and, 
thereby, gives you evidence and (2) causation is personal, unreliable, and, thereby, gives you no 
evidence. But, as can be seen from the Stuart example, there are other ways of viewing causation 
than just these two. There is also the possibility that personal causation can include both free and 
stable elements. This idea, which is very much part of our common ‘folk psychology,’ has been 
seriously discussed by philosophers at least as far back as Aristotle, who famously referred to the 
stable elements in the human psyche as propensities or dispositions to act. On Aristotle’s view, 
as in ‘folk psychology,’ such propensities or dispositions are not unchangeable. They can be 
modified through training and moral instruction. But they are reliable enough to warrant our 
saying under certain circumstances, ‘What she did surprises me’ and ‘That doesn’t seem like the 
kind of thing that she would do at all.’ In other words, they provide us with evidence one way or 
the other about what people are likely to do.  
Of course, when Aristotle was talking about these propensities or dispositions, he was 
primarily thinking about traits like ‘courage,’ ‘self-control,’ and ‘magnificence’ and about how 
these contributed to each individual’s personal excellence. He was not thinking about the 
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epistemological or evidential consequences for others of individuals possessing certain traits. 
But, nonetheless, using this model of the psyche, and the picture of personal causation that it 
entails, we can easily see how we would generate such consequences and what these 
consequences would be. Take, for example, the critical notion of ‘trustworthiness.’ While, on the 
one hand, this concept can certainly be used only to evaluate an individual’s personal moral 
excellence (with no consideration of what its presence or absence might mean for others), on the 
other, having evidence in favor of its presence or absence in someone would have significant 
epistemic implications for those who had the occasion to rely upon this individual for the content 
of their beliefs. This is because, in such a case, evidence that the individual was trustworthy 
would be evidence for something along the following lines: that there was a propensity or 
disposition in the individual to produce sincere, competently arrived-at statements of purported 
fact. That is what trustworthiness with respect to ‘tellings’ is all about. And, thus, in such a case, 
there would evidence of a reliable connection between what has been told and the ways things 
really are. And, thus, on the notion of evidence that we have been using so far, there would be 
evidence in favor of the likely truth of what has been told. 
What our view contributes to this picture of justification is a set of conditions under 
which an addressee A can be justified in the belief that a speaker S is likely to be trustworthy 
(with respect to a range of testimonial statements), and thus justified – evidentially – in accepting 
as factual the content of one of S’s pieces of testimony. On our view, what justifies A in 
believing that S is trustworthy with respect to a particular piece of testimony, t, is the fact that, in 
connection with stating t, S openly commits herself to truthfully answering skeptical questions 
about what she knows. Given that criticism and the potential loss of reputation that successful 
criticism produces are genuine harms for S, it is unlikely that she would openly risk, indeed 
invite, such criticism were she telling falsehoods or speaking without requisite authority. 
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